A Brief Comment on Motivation and Impact by Perry, Michael
COMMENTS
RENT CONTROL: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR
TENANT ORGANIZATIONS
Large, repeated rent increases present a serious problem to
many tenants. Rent contro a legislative response to this problem,
attempts to protect tenants by regulating such increases. Because
rent control legislation must satisfy due process standards, care-
ful draftsmanship is essential to its validity. This Comment ana-
lyzes various types of rent control measures and examines the
reasons courts have upheld or have invalidated specific provi-
sions of such legislation. It can serve as a guide to tenant organi-
zations and to others interested in designing rent control
measures capable of withstanding constitutional attack.
State and local rent controls first appeared immediately after
World War I to meet the housing crisis resulting from the termi-
nation of voluntary controls.l The states and cities adopting rent
controls considered them temporary emergency measures that
would be unconstitutional in other circumstances. During World
War IT, Congress provided for rent control on a national basis
which in some areas continued until 1954.2
In recent years, the primary leaders of the tenant organization
movement have been middle class citizens who were forced into
tenant status with an accompanying loss of bargaining power.3 In
1. Baar & Keating, The Last Stand of Economic Substantive Due Process-The
Housing Emergency Requirement for Rent Contro4 7 URnB. LAw. 447, 456 (1975).
2. Baar, Rent Control in the 1970's: The Case of the New Jersey Tenant's
Movement, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 634 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Rent Control in
the 1970's]. For a history of rent control up to World War II, see Willis, A Short
History of Rent Control Laws, 36 CoRNELL L.Q. 54 (1950); Comment, Residential
Rent Control in New York City, 3 COLUM. JL & Soc. PROB. 30 (1967).
3. Rent Control in the 1970's, supra note 2, at 634. Rent Control in the 1970's de-
scribes the history, organization, and strategies of the New Jersey Tenant's Organ-
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1969, these leaders began organizing to exert pressure for rent
controls.4 However, some initial efforts failed; local rent control
ordinances were held invalid in Florida and in Massachusetts on
the ground that cities in these states lacked home rule power to
adopt rent control.5 Both states subsequently enacted enabling
legislation giving municipalities the power to pass rent control or-
dinances. 6 Also, Connecticut passed a local option law allowing
municipalities to establish fair rent commissions with power to
control and eliminate excessive rental charges. 7
Federal rent control began in 1971 pursuant to the Economic
Stabilization Act of 1970.8 August 15, 1971, marked the beginning
of Phase I, a ninety-day freeze on all wages, prices, and rents.9
Phase 11 involved an economic stabilization program and permit-
ted landlords to increase rents by a limited amount each year.lo
During Phase II, landlords could obtain additional rent increases
under certain circumstances." On January 12, 1973, Phase H con-
trols ended, and Phase III, calling for voluntary restraint, began.12
The termination of Phase IH controls prompted passage of sig-
nificant state and local rent control measures. The peacetime reg-
ulation of rents, labeled "Second Generation Rent Control," has
since been found in communities with increasing inflation and
low vacancy rates. Rent controls are an attempt to compensate for
ization. More than 110 New Jersey municipalities have adopted rent control within
the past five years. Id., at 631.
4. Id., at 634-36. New York City is unique because with the exception of the
period between 1929 and 1942, it has had continuous controls since 1921. For dis-
cussions of rent control in New York City, see Comment, The ABC's of MBR: How
to Spell Trouble in Landlord/Tenant Relations (Up Against the Crumbling Walls),
10 COLUJm. .L. & Soc. PROB. 113 (1974); Comment, Residential Rent Control in New
York City, 3 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 30 (1967).
5. City of Miami Beach v. Fleetwood Hotel, Inc., 261 So. 2d 801 (Fla. 1972); Mar-
shal House, Inc. v. Rent Review & Grievance Bd., 357 Mass. 709, 260 N.E.2d 200
(1970).
6. Act of June 7, 1973, ch. 73-129, 1973 Fla. Laws 238 (codified at FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 166.021 (West 1973)); Act of Aug. 31, 1970, ch. 842, §§ 1-14 (codified at MAss. GEN.
LAws ANN. ch. 40 app., §§ 1-1 to -14 (West Supp. 1977)) (expired 1976). Massachu-
setts adopted enabling legislation for two of the four cities that adopted rent con-
trol ordinances prior to the expiration of the option law. Special enabling acts for
the other two cities were still in effect. Rent Control in the 1970's, supra note 2, at
638.
7. Pub. Act 274, 1969 Conn. Pub. Acts 294 (amended 1971 & 1972) (codified at
CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-148b (West 1972)).
8. Pub. L. No. 91-379, tit. II, 84 Stat. 799 (1970) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1904 note
(1976)) (expired 1974).
9. Exec. Order No. 11,615, 3 C.F.R. 602 (1971-1975 Compilation).
10. Exec. Order No. 11,627, 3 C.F.R. 621 (1971-1975 Compilation).
11. Rent Control in the 1970's, supra note 2, at 639-40. Landlords were allowed
rent increases on the basis of state and local property tax increases, increases due
to capital improvements, base rent increases upon lease renewals, and hardship
increases.
12. Exec. Order No. 11,695, 3 C.F.R. 741 (1971-1975 Compilation).
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tenants' lack of bargaining power with regard to rents and hous-
ing conditions in these communities. 3
Today, several methods of enacting rent control legislation ex-
ist. A state may pass a rent control statute which covers every
residential unit within that state,14 or it may adopt enabling legis-
lation specifically empowering municipalities to enact rent control
measures without risking state preemption. 5 A city or county
may enact rent control by local ordinance pursuant to its home
rule or local police powers.16 Finally, voters may use the initiative
process to enact rent control at the state or local level.'7
SumM2ARY OF ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST RENT CONTROL 18
Opponents of rent control argue that the reduced expected re-
turns accompanying rent control produce many adverse effects.
For example, opponents assert that rent control discourages in-
vestment in housing. They maintain that rent controls prolong
housing shortages because lenders are reluctant to lend money
13. Blumberg, Robbins, & Baar, The Emergence of Second Generation Rent
Controls, 8 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 240, 240 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Second Gen-
eration Rent Controls]. Tenants' bargaining power is greatly impaired when va-
cancy rates fall below five percent for the overall market and three percent for
low- and moderate-income housing. See id. at 240 n.4.
14. Id at 241-42. Statewide controls may be weaker than municipal controls;
they may also be more rigid. The governing body of a municipality may amend a
local law easily and frequently in response to changing local conditions. However,
it is doubtful that a state legislature would respond as quickly to the needs of a
single city or county. "[A] key committee member, possibly one who had few te-
nants in his district, could bottle up a critical piece of legislation." Rent Control in
the 1970's, supra note 2, at 682.
15. E.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 5372 (West Supp. 1973).
16. Second Generation Rent Controls, supra note 13, at 241. Municipal controls
can have certain drawbacks. If rent control is achieved strictly by municipal con-
trol, no two municipalities will have the same rent-leveling scheme. Also, local or-
dinances are subject to frequent changes. This characteristic creates uncertainty
in the market by making it impossible for potential investors to predict future re-
turns. Thus, rent regulation by local ordinance may discourage investment. Rent
Control in the 1970's, supra note 2, at 681. Proponents of rent control should weigh
the benefits and drawbacks of both municipal and statewide controls before set-
tling upon a course of action.
17. See, e.g., Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley, 17 Cal. 3d 129, 550 P.2d 1001, 130 Cal.
Rptr. 465 (1976). The primary use of the initiative has been at the local leveL Sec-
ond Generation Rent Controls, supra note 13, at 241 n.22.
18. A detailed discussion of the complex economic arguments regarding the
desirability and the effectiveness of rent control is beyond the scope of this
Comment. This section summarizes selected arguments from both sides.
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for the construction of rental housing in controlled areas.19 In ad-
dition, landlords of controlled units may not receive income suffi-
cient to cover both cost and profit requirements. Landlords may
therefore defer normal maintenance services or attempt to exact
additional payments for items usually included in the price of
apartment rental.2
0
Proponents of rent control argue that during housing shortages,
as demonstrated by low vacancy rates, tenants in effect lose their
freedom of choice.2 1 In such circumstances, tenants who must de-
cide whether to pay exorbitant rents or to move actually have no
choice but to pay the higher rents. Proponents of rent control ar-
gue that the housing supply is slow to respond to increased de-
mand, thus creating a situation '"ripe for exploitation."22 They
maintain that landlords exploit housing shortages by raising rent
levels to a disproportionate extent compared with housing cost in-
creases. Rent control proponents claim that controls curb excess
rents and restore rents to a level which is fair to both landlords
and tenants.2 3
GENERAL CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTIONS ON
RENT CONTROL LEGISLATION
Due Process-Public Emergency Versus
Rational Relation Requirements
Rent control statutes and ordinances usually contain "boiler-
plate" declarations of a housing emergency. 24 Until recent years,
almost all courts have viewed the declaration of an emergency as
a prerequisite to the legislation's constitutionality.25 Modernly,
several courts have rejected the housing emergency doctrine and
have upheld rent control measures even in the absence of a
proven emergency.26
The concept of a housing emergency "requirement" stems from
the concept of economic due process, which subjected matters of
19. C. AsHuN & R. FRANKEN, RENT CoNTRoL: AN INTumt REPORT TO THE ASSEM-
BLY COMMITTEE ON HOUSING AND COMMUNnT DEVELOPENT 28 (1975).
20. Id. at 28-29, 31.
21. Id. at 31.
22. Id. at 32.
23. Id.
24. Baar& Keating, The Last Stand of Economic Substantive Due Process-The
Housing Emergency Requirementfor Rent Control, 7 URB. LAw. 447, 449 (1975).
25. For a thorough discussion of the housing emergency requirement and a vig-
orous argument for its elimination, see id.
26. Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 841
(1970); Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley, 17 Cal. 3d 129, 550 P.2d 1001, 130 Cal. Rptr.
465 (1976); Westchester W. No. 2 Ltd. v. Montgomery County, 276 Md. 48, 348 A.2d
856 (1975); Hutton Park Gardens v. Town Council, 68 N.J. 543, 350 A.2d 1 (1975).
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economic regulation to judicial intervention.27 The United States
Supreme Court first applied this concept when in light of the
emergency conditions created by World War I, it upheld rent con-
trol laws in Block v. Hirsh28 and Marcus Brown Holding Co. v.
Feldman.29 The Court explained in Block that "[t] he regulation is
put and justified only as a temporary measure.... A limit in
time, to tide over a passing trouble, well may justify a law that
could not be upheld as a permanent change."3o Three years later,
in Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair,3 1 the Court made clear that it
would not tolerate extension of these World War I rent controls
beyond the emergency period. Applying a narrow standard of
emergency, the Court stated. "If about all that remains of war
conditions is the increased cost of living, that is not in itself a jus-
tification of the act."32 Since its decision in Chastleton, the
Supreme Court has not considered specifically the extent to
which state or municipal legislative bodies may constitutionally
impose rent controls.
The Supreme Court's views in the related fields of price and
wage controls have changed substantially since the Court decided
Chastleton in 1924. During the early 1920's a majority of the
Supreme Court viewed the liberty protected by the fifth and four-
teenth amendment due process clauses as including a freedom of
contract.3 The due process clauses thus normally precluded leg-
islative bodies from regulating prices or wages in businesses not
"affected with a public interest."3 4 The Supreme Court repudiated
27. Second Generation Rent Controls, supra note 13, at 242.
28. 256 U.S. 135 (1921).
29. 256 U.S. 170 (1921).
30. 256 U.S. at 157.
31. 264 U.S. 543 (1924).
32. Id. at 548. The Court reversed, stating that the court below should ascertain
and weigh the facts to determine whether the emergency justifying the statute
still existed. Id. at 549.
33. See Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
34. Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235 (1929); Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S.
350 (1928); Tyson & Brother v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418 (1927). The Supreme Court sug-
gested three classes of businesses "affected with a public interest":
(1) Those which are carried on under the authority of a public grant of
privileges which either expressly or impliedly imposes the affirmative
duty of rendering a public service demanded by any member of the pub-
lic. Such are the railroads, other common carriers and public utilities.
(2) Certain occupations, regarded as exceptional, the public interest
attaching to which, recognized from earliest times, has survived the period
of arbitrary laws... regulating all trades and callings. Such are those of
the keepers of inns, cabs, and grist mills ....
(3) Businesses which though not public at their inception may be
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this restrictive view of the police power during the 1930's, begin-
ning with Nebbia v. New York.35 Since its decision in Nebbia, the
Court generally has upheld price control legislation regardless of
whether an emergency existed or whether the business was one
affected with a public interest.36 The Court requires only that a
law be reasonably related to a proper legislative purpose and be
neither arbitrary nor discriminatory. 37
Yet most rent control measures routinely continue to include a
declaration of housing emergency, for courts of several jurisdic-
tions continue to treat the existence of an emergency as essential
to the constitutionality of rent control. These courts distinguish
housing from wage and price control as one of the "necessities of
life," the price of which may not routinely be regulated as a nor-
mal legislative policy.38 Many of these courts purport to require
an emergency but defer to a legislative declaration of emergency
in the rent control statute. The declaration coupled with the ab-
sence of any affirmative proof that the declaration is untrue satis-
fies the emergency requirement.39 Other courts, however, seize
upon the lack of a sufficiently serious emergency as a reason for
invalidating rent control legislation.40 These opinions do not dis-
cuss the emergency requirement in light of the United States
Supreme Court's change of approach to the constitutionality of
price controls.
Still other courts have concluded that the fundamental change
in the Supreme Court's approach renders the emergency require-
ment obsolete. In Eisen v. Eastman,41 Judge Friendly stated for
the majority:.
fairly said to have risen to be such, and have become subject in conse-
quence to some government regulation .... IT]he owner by devoting his
business to the public use, in effect grants the public an interest in that
use, and subjects himself to public regulation to the extent of that interest
Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indus. Relations, 262 U.S. 522, 535 (1923).
35. 291 U.S. 502 (1934). The Court declared.
So far as the requirement of due process is concerned, and in the ab-
sence of other constitutional restriction, a state is free to adopt whatever
economic policy may reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare,
and to enforce that policy by legislation adapted to its purpose .... If the
lqws passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative
pirpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of
due process are satisfied ....
l at 537.
36. Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236 (1941).
37. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. at 537.
38. See City of Miami Beach v. Fleetwood Hotel, Inc., 261 So. 2d 801, 804-05 (Fla.
1972); Warren v. City of Philadelphia, 387 Pa. 362, 365-66, 127 A.2d 703, 705 (1956).
39. See, e.g., Russell v. Treasurer, 331 Mass. 501, 120 N.E.2d 388 (1954).
40. See, e.g., City of Miami Beach v. Fleetwood Hotel, Inc., 261 So. 2d 801 (Fla.
1972). Warren v. City of Philadelphia, 387 Pa. 362, 127 A.2d 703 (1956).
41. 421 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 841 (1970).
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[W]e have no doubt that [the United States Supreme Court] would sus-
tain the validity of rent control today... The time when extraordinarily
exigent circumstances were required to justify price control outside the
traditional public utility areas passed on the day that Nebbia v. New York
... was decided. Whether, as some believe, rent control does not prolong
the very condition that gave it birth is a policy issue not appropriate for
judicial concern.4 2
In 1975, the New Jersey Supreme Court noted that "[f] or con-
stitutional purposes, rent control is indistinguishable from other
types of governmental price regulation."43 This court echoed
Judge Friendly and concluded that the United States Supreme
Court's general abandonment of the emergency requirement for
price regulation also applies to rent control.44 The Maryland
Court of Appeals used the same reasoning to decide a rent control
case one week later. 45 More recently, the California Supreme
Court held that the constitutional standards applicable to "other
consumer prices" also apply to the regulation of rents.46 The court
stated that if the operative provisions of legislation regulating
prices is reasonably related to the accomplishment of a legitimate
governmental objective, the legislation is within the state's police
power.47
Drafters of rent control legislation should determine whether
their jurisdiction still requires a housing emergency to justify reg-
ulation of rents. If the jurisdiction so requires, the legislation
should include a declaration of the conditions constituting the
emergency. However, the drafter should remember that a narrow
construction of "emergency" may nevertheless lead to invalida-
tion of the measure.46 The drafter in a jurisdiction no longer re-
quiring a housing emergency to sustain the legislation's
constitutionality need not include a "boilerplate" declaration.
However, inclusion of a detailed factual statement of the actual
42. I at 567.
43. Hutton Park Gardens v. Town Council, 68 N.J. 543, 555-56, 350 A.2d 1, 7
(1975).
44. Id. at 556-64, 350 A.2d at 8-12.
45. See Westchester W. No. 2 Ltd. v. Montgomery County, 276 Md. 448, 348 A.2d
856 (1975).
46. Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley, 17 Cal. 3d 129, 159, 550 P.2d 1001, 1023, 130 Cal.
Rptr. 465, 487 (1976).
47. Id at 158, 550 P.2d at 1022, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
48. See, e.g., City of Miami Beach v. Fleetwood Hotel, Inc., 261 So. 2d 801, 804
(Fla. 1972). In this case, the court used the narrow definition of emergency set
forth by the United States Supreme Court in Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S.
543 (1924), stating that an increase in cost of living in itself does not constitute an
emergency.
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conditions in the community enhances the probability that a
court would uphold the legislation. If the court were to defer to
the legislative findings, the statement could demonstrate that the
legislation is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental ob-
jective.49
Due Process-Non-Confiscatory Requirement
Opponents of rent control legislation also attack it for failing to
provide a fair return on investment to landlords. Opponents
charge that the legislation constitutes a taking of property with-
out due process of law, characterizing the rent control formula as
arbitrary, unreasonable, or confiscatory.50
Rent control legislation may be subject to attack as confisca-
tory on its face. An ordinance may be "so restrictive as to facially
preclude any possibility of a just and reasonable return." 51 A reg-
ulation is facially invalid when its terms do not permit adminis-
trators to avoid confiscatory results.52 For example, in City of
Miami Beach v. Forte Towers, InC.,53 the Supreme Court of Flor-
ida invalidated a rent control ordinance because of its administra-
tive standards and guidelines. Four Justices found the guidelines
so fixed and arbitrary that they prevented the administrator from
allowing a fair rate of return.54 The California Supreme Court has
also made clear, in Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley,55 that an adjust-
ing mechanism must accompany the imposition of rent ceilings of
indefinite duration. A mechanism is sufficient only if it can pro-
vide adjustments in maximum rents without causing substan-
tially greater delay than is practically necessary.5 6 The court
found a city charter amendment constitutionally deficient be-
cause it prescribed adjustment procedures that would make un-
reasonable delays inevitable.5 7
49. See Second Generation Rent Controls, supra note 13, at 242. See also
Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley, 17 Cal. 3d 129, 160, 550 P.2d 1001, 1024, 130 Cal. Rptr.
465, 488 (1976).
50. Second Generation Rent Contro4 supra note 13, at 248.
51. Hutton Park Gardens v. Town Council, 68 N.J. 543, 571, 350 A.2d 1, 16 (1975).
52. Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley, 17 Cal. 3d 127, 165, 550 P.2d 1001, 1027, 130 Cal.
Rptr. 465, 491 (1976).
53. 305 So. 2d 764 (Fla. 1974).
54. Id. at 768. A landlord could obtain an adjustment under this ordinance if the
landlord's net annual return was less than six percent of the property's assessed
valuation on the date base rents were set.
55. 17 Cal. 3d 129, 550 P.2d 1001, 130 Cal. Rptr. 465 (1976).
56. Id at 169, 550 P.2d at 1030, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 494.
57. Id. The rent control board lacked the power to order general rent adjust-
ments or to consider a landlord's petition for an adjustment without a "full-blown"
hearing. The board could not easily consolidate hearings or delegate the responsi-
bility for holding hearings. A landlord's petition for a hearing could not be consid.
ered unless it included a certificate of housing code compliance. "[B]ecause of the
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The just-and-reasonable-return requirement does not mandate
the use of any particular mechanism of regulation; the means
chosen simply must be neither arbitrary nor unreasonable.58 A
regulation which incidentally reduces property values is not nec-
essarily invalid for this reason.5 9 Furthermore, the permitted rate
of return is evaluated on the basis of returns on investments in
other enterprises with similar risks. It need not be as high as that
prevailing in the business prior to regulation.60 Finally, in at least
one jurisdiction, the courts read into the rent control ordinance an
implied assurance to landlords of a just and reasonable return.
6 1
This implied assurance protects the legislation from charges that
it is facially confiscatory.
In order to survive a constitutional challenge, a rent control
regulation must be nonconfiscatory as applied as well as noncon-
fiscatory on its face. In Troy Hills Village v. Township Council,
62
the New Jersey Supreme Court set forth guidelines in broad dicta
for lower courts to follow in fair return cases. The first step is the
calculation of the actual rate of return which the landlord will re-
ceive under the rent control ordinance. Second, the guidelines call
for determining the rate of return below which a return would be
confiscatory. This is the just and reasonable rate of return on a
given rental unit.63 If the actual rate of return falls below the just
and reasonable rate of return, the ordinance is invalid as confisca-
lack of these powers, once rents were rolled back case-by-case procedures would
be incapable of adjusting inequitable rent ceilings except for 'a lucky few.' This ad-
ministrative inflexibility, according to the court, made some confiscation inevita-
ble." Case Note, Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley, 65 CALIF. L. REV. 304, 316 (1977).
58. Hutton Park Gardens v. Town Council, 68 N.J. 543, 569, 350 A.2d 1, 15 (1975).
59. 1d&
60. I& at 570, 350 A.2d at 15. The New Jersey Supreme Court further stated that
rent levels are not objectionable merely because they fix returns at a lower rate
for inefficient operators, do not reward persons who have paid excessive or in-
flated purchase prices for their property, or otherwise work hardships on land-
lords in atypical situations. I&L
61. See, e.g., id at 572, 350 A,2d at 16. See also Brunetti v. Borough of New
Milford, 68 N.J. 576, 350 A.2d 19 (1975). In Brunetti, the New Jersey Supreme Court
held New Milford's rent control ordinance not confiscatory on its face. The ordi-
nance permitted annual, although limited, increases in rental charges and unlim-
ited hardship rent increases when a landlord could not realize a reasonable return
on his investment. Id at 592, 350 A.2d at 27.
62. 68 N.J. 604, 350 A.2d 34 (1975).
63. Id. at 622-30, 350 A.2d at 44-48. The court declared that a just and reasonable
rate of return must be high enough "to encourage good management... to fur-
nish a reward for efficiency, to discourage the flight of capital from the rental
housing market, and to enable operators to maintain and support their credit" Id
at 629, 350 A.2d at 47.
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tory.64 The court's only function is determining the lowest consti-
tutionally permissible rate.65 The Troy Hills Village guidelines
have been criticized as vague standards.
66
Rent control legislation should not compel efficient landlords to
accept less than a just and reasonable rate of return.67 Drafters
should guard against provisions or procedures that render the leg-
islation facially confiscatory. In addition, drafters should continu-
ously review available statistical data in order to design
successfully an ordinance which is nonconfiscatory as applied.
State Versus Municipal Exercise of Police Power to
Regulate Rents
Tenant organizations should determine whether their cities or
counties have the power to enact rent controls or whether state
action will be necessary. State law concerning the relationship be-
tween a state and its municipalities determines the extent of a
given municipality's authority.68 In some states, municipalities
have no power to enact a rent control law unless state legislation
authorizes the exercise of such power by a municipality.69 In
other states, while rent control is not a municipal affair, rent con-
trol legislation is nevertheless effective to the extent that it does
not conflict with general law.70 In still other states, as an exercise
of their police power, municipalities may control rents and evic-
tions to meet an emergency housing shortage affecting the public
health, safety, and welfare.
71
Once a municipality is found to have the power to enact rent
controls, the tenant organization's second step is to determine
64. Id. at 622, 350 A.2d at 43.
65. Id.
66. See, e.g., Rent Control in the 1970s, supra note 2, at 676-78. Determining
value is a critical step in calculating actual rate of return. However, the Troy Hills
Village court did not decide how to determine the value of rental property. In-
stead, the court discussed available techniques and highlighted the weak points of
each method. Also, the court demanded that "aberrant forces" (in the Troy Hills
Village situation a housing shortage) be discounted in determining value. How-
ever, the court did not offer guidelines as to how this would be accomplished. See
Troy Hills Village v. Township Council, 68 N.J. 604, 623-26, 350 A.2d 34, 44-46 (1975).
67. Troy Hills Village v. Township Council, 68 N.J. 604, 630, 350 A.2d 34, 47 (1975).
68. See Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley, 17 Cal. 3d 129, 140-41, 550 P.2d 1001, 1009-
10, 130 Cal. Rptr. 465, 473-74 (1976).
69. See, e.g., City of Miami Beach v. Fleetwood Hotel, Inc., 261 So. 2d 801, 804
(Fla. 1972).
70. See, e.g., Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley, 17 Cal. 3d 129, 141, 550 P.2d 1001,
1010, 130 Cal. Rptr. 465, 474 (1976).
71. See, e.g., Inganamort v. Borough of Fort Lee, 62 N.J. 521, 533-34, 303 A.2d 298,
303 (1973); Warren v. City of Philadelphia, 382 Pa. 380, 383-84, 115 A.2d 218, 220
(1955).
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whether the state has preempted the area.72 The initial question
in preemption analysis is whether the state has acted in the field
in which the ordinance operates.73 If it has, certain other ques-
tions must be answered:-
1. Does the ordinance conflict with state law, either because of conflict-
ing policies or operational effect (that is, does the ordinance forbid
what the Legislature has permitted or... permit what the Legislature
has forbidden)?
2. Was the state law intended, expressly or impliedly, to be exclusive in
the field?
3. Does the subject matter reflect a need for uniformity... ?
4. Is the state scheme so pervasive or comprehensive that it precludes
coexistence of municipal regulation?
5. Does the ordinance stand "as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives" of the Legislature?7 4
When an ordinance deals with subject matter that the state has
preempted, the ordinance is void.75 Preemption often invalidates
local rent control provisions dealing with eviction when the state
provides landlords with a summary procedure for exercising the
right of repossession against tenants. 76 If an ordinance attempts
to change these procedures in connection with rent-controlled
units, this section of the ordinance invalidly conflicts with state
law. 7 However, even where certain portions of an ordinance are
invalid, the remaining sections retain their validity unless the
voided sections are essential to the purpose of rent regulation.78
72. Overlook Terrace Management Corp. v. Rent Control Bd., 71 N.J. 451,461, 366
A.2d 321, 326 (1976). Federal preemption is also possible. The Department of Hous-
ing and Urban Development has recently promulgated a regulation which has re-
sulted in preemption of some local rent control laws. A full discussion of the
regulation is beyond the scope of this Comment. However, drafters of rent control
measures should be aware of the regulation's effect. In brief, the regulation super-
sedes state and local rent control laws with respect to projects financially sup-
ported by mortgages insured or held by the Department of Housing and Urban
Development. See 24 C.F.J § 403 (1976). See generally Note, Pre-Emption of Local
Rent Control Laws by HUD Regulation, 45 FORDHAm L. REV. 651 (1977).
73. Overlook Terrace Management Corp. v. Rent Control Bd., 71 N.J. 451, 461, 366
A.2d 321, 326 (1976).
74. ld at 461-62, 366 A.2d at 326.
75. Brunetti v. Borough of New Milford, 68 N.J. 576, 601, 350 A.2d 19, 32 (1975).
76. See, e.g., CAT_ Civ. PRoc. CODE §§ 1159-1179a (West Supp. 1977).
77. See, e.g., Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley, 17 Cal. 3d 129, 153-54, 550 P.2d 1001,
1018, 130 Cal. Rptr. 465, 482 (1976); Brunetti v. Borough of New Milford, 68 N.J. 576,
602-03, 350 A.2d 19, 33 (1975).
78. Lifschitz v. City of Miami Beach, 339 So. 2d 232, 235 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
See also Brunetti v. Borough of New Milford, 68 N.J. 576, 600 n.23, 350 A-2d 19, 31
n.23 (1975) (the ordinance contained a severability or saving clause).
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DRAFTING RENT CONTROL LEGISLATION-SPECIFIC
CONTENTS AND PROBLEMS
Exemptions
Drafters of rent control measures should consider which units
the legislation will cover and which will be exempt from regula-
tion. For example, in attempting to avoid making the housing pro-
duction field unattractive to investors, developers, or lending
institutions, legislation might exclude "new housing"-either
newly offered or newly constructed units-from control.
79
Another exclusion method is by number of units. New Jersey
ordinances often exempt rental units with four or fewer units
from coverage.80 A rent control measure could also exclude "lux-
ury" housing.81 However, an ordinance need not include a luxury-
housing exemption; the mere fact that the more affluent tenant
might not be affected to the same degree as the low-income ten-
ant has been held insufficient to invalidate the legislation.
82
Drafters making decisions concerning exemptions from rent
control legislation should consult the housing characteristic ele-
ments of the most recent census. Drafters should keep in mind
the number and the types of units they plan to exclude. They
should consider the income level of the tenants in these units,
and they should determine whether existing forms of control al-
ready regulate these units. Drafters should also consult econo-
mists and local planners to predetermine the direct effect of a
given exclusion.8 3
Setting Base Rents and Rollback Provisions
Almost every rent control measure specifies a date which de-
termines the base-period rent. Rent increases are later computed
using this figure. Often, the legislation contains a rollback provi-
sion selecting a date prior to the enactment of rent controls to set
initial rent levels.84
Rollback provisions are desirable for two reasons. First, the
rent charged on a prior date theoretically approximates the rent
that would be paid in an open market without the upward pres-
79. Second Generation Rent Controls, supra note 13, at 242. See, e.g., City of
Miami Beach v. Fleetwood Hotel, Inc., 261 So. 2d 801, 803 (Fla. 1972); Brunetti v.
Borough of New Milford, 68 N.J. 576, 583, 350 A.2d 19, 22 (1975).
80. See Rent Control in the 1970's, supra note 2, at 660 n.187.
81. For example, Massachusetts' enabling act allowed municipalities to exclude
up to 25% of their highest-rent units. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 40 app., § 1-
3(b) (7) (West Supp. 1977) (expired 1976).
82. See Muss v. City of Miami Beach, 339 So. 2d 236 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
83. Second Generation Rent Controls, supra note 13, at 243.
84. Id.
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sures leading to rent control.85 Second, by setting the prior date
early enough, the legislation can avoid incorporating landlords'
anticipatory, last-minute increases and freezing them into con-
trolled rental levels.86 Landlords might challenge the use of the
prior date as arbitrary and unreasonable. However, courts have
upheld rent control legislation against such challenges, noting
that the rent level in effect on the rollback date may have yielded
an unreasonably high return at the time the landlord initially se-
lected it.87 Courts rarely strike down the rollback provision stand-
ing alone.88
However, rollback provisions coupled with cumbersome adjust-
ment procedures may render rent control legislation confiscatory
and unconstitutional. In Birkeneld,89 a city charter amendment
called for an automatic, universal rollback with slow, case-by-case
relief of any inequitable results. 9 0 The California Supreme Court
held that these provisions would deprive landlords of due process
of law if they were permitted to take effect.91 Similarly, in City of
Miami Beach v. Forte Towers, Inc.,9 2 the Supreme Court of Flor-
ida struck down a rent control ordinance in part because of the
rollback provision. The ordinance "froze" rents at an earlier date
and set forth inflexible standards and guidelines for granting in-
creases.9 3 Costs had continually increased since the rollback date.
This fact, coupled with the restrictions on the administrator's abil-
ity to allow a nonconfiscatory rate of return, led the court to inval-
idate the ordinance.9 4
85. Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley, 17 Cal. 3d 129, 166, 550 P.2d 1001, 1027, 130 Cal.
Rptr. 465, 491 (1976).
86. Id.1; Marshal House, Inc. v. Rent Control Bd., 358 Mass. 686, 701, 266 N.E.2d
876, 886 (1971).
87. See, e.g., Hutton Park Gardens v. Town Council, 68 N.J. 543, 574, 350 A.2d 1,
17 (1975).
88. Rollback provisions standing alone have weathered attack in several states.
E.g., Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley, 17 Cal. 3d 129, 550 P.2d 1001, 130 Cal. Rptr. 465
(1976); Marshal House, Inc. v. Rent Control Bd., 358 Mass. 686, 266 N.E.2d 876
(1971); Hutton Park Gardens v. Town Council, 68 N.J. 543, 350 A.2d 1 (1975).
89. 17 Cal 3d 129, 550 P.2d 1001, 130 Cal. Rptr. 465 (1976).
90. Id. at 169-72, 550 P.2d at 1030-32, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 494-96. "The Board has no
power to adjust rent ceilings on any one of these thousands of units until it has
received a separate petition for that unit and considered the petition at an adjust-
ment hearing." Id. at 170, 550 P.2d at 1030, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 494.
91. Id. at 173, 550 P.2d at 1033, 130 Cal Rptr. at 497.
92. 305 So. 2d 764 (Fla. 1974).
93. Id at 767. See note 54 supra for the formula set by the Miami Beach ordi-
nance.
94. 305 So. 2d 764, 768 (Fla. 1974).
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Not all rent control legislation contains rollback provisions; in
some instances, base rents are those that were in effect on the
day the measure was adopted.9 5 If drafters decide to use a prior
date to determine base rents, they should also include adjustment
procedures which are sufficiently flexible to minimize confisca-
tory results.
Rent Adjusting Mechanisms for Subsequent Rent Adjustments
Rent control legislation allows landlords restricted rent in-
creases; it does not place an absolute freeze on rents. Several al-
ternative methods for rent adjustment are return-on-investment
formulas, percentage increase with allowable pass-throughs, eval-
uation of individual cases by rent control boards, and hardship
rent adjustments.
Return-on-Investment Formulas
Rent control legislation may restrict the landlord's return on in-
vestment by using a formula. Under this method, the rent control
board or administrator first determines fair profit levels for a base
year.9 6 The board then considers factors such as the following to
determine whether a controlled unit yields a fair net operating in-
come and whether to grant a rent increase:
(1) [i]ncreases or decreases in property taxes;
(2) unavoidable increases or any decreases in operating and mainte-
nance expenses;
(3) capital improvement of the housing unit as distinguished from ordi-
nary repair, replacement and maintenance;
(4) increases or decreases in living space, services, furniture, furnishings
or equipment;
(5) substantial deterioration of the housing units other than as a result
of ordinary wear and tear; and
(6) failure to perform ordinary repair, replacement and maintenance. 97
This list of factors is not exhaustive; the rent control board or ad-
ministrator may consider others.98
Commentators have suggested that the return-on-investment
formula, which operates on a case-by-case basis, best applies to
.95. See, e.g., provisions of local rent control ordinances set forth in Westchester
W. No. 2 Ltd. v. Montgomery County, 276 Md. 448, 449, 348 A.2d 856, 857 (1975) (or-
dinance enacted September 18, 1973, with effective date of October 1, 1973; base
rents were rents charged for September, 1973); Troy Hills Village v. Township
Council, 68 N.J. 604, 613 n.2, 350 A.2d 34, 38 n.2 (1975) (ordinance adopted in April,
1973; base rents were those in effect as of April, 1973).
96. Second Generation Rent Controls, supra note 13, at 243.
97. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 5375(2) (West Supp. 1973). The Berkeley char-
ter amendment provided similar factors. Amendment to Berkeley City Charter,
art. XVII, § 5, res. ch. 96, 1972 Cal. Stats. 3370, reprinted in Birkenfeld v. City of
Berkeley, 17 Cal. 3d at 174-80, 550 P.2d at 1033-40, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 497-504.
98. See ME. REV. STAT. AN1N. tit. 30, § 5375(2) (West Supp. 1973).
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three specific situations. They have maintained that drafters
should use the return-on-investment method when existing hous-
ing stock deteriorates significantly, when rents are excessive, or
when rents are in great disparity. If a city with widely varying
rents were to enact rent controls with adjustments based on an
annual percentage, landlords who had kept their rents low would
in effect be penalized. However, landlords who had been charging
exorbitant rents would retain high rates of return and would ob-
tain larger rent increases.99 "The return on investment formula
can equalize these rents by denying rent increases, decreasing
excessive rents, or allowing moderate increases on existing low
rents. In areas where rents are uniformly exorbitant a return on
investment formula might allow a resetting of rents to reasonable
levels." 00
Percentage Increase-Based on the Consumer Price Index or
on a Flat Percentage-with Allowable Pass-Throughs
A rent control system may tie the annual rental increase to the
percentage increase in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) for the
preceding year.'Ol The percentage used to compute a rent in-
crease may be 100% of the CPI's percentage increase, or it may be
99. Second Generation Rent Controls, supra note 13, at 244. For example, as-
sume L charges rent of $100 per month which gives him a reasonable return on
investment for a particular apartment. L2 charges $200 for similar premiies and
thus receives an exorbitant rate of return. The following year, rent of $150 per
month is necessary to provide a reasonable rate of return. If a rent control ordi-
nance allows a 5% increase, Ll can increase his rent to $105 per month. However,
L2 can increase his rent to $210 per month and can continue to receive an exorbi-
tant monthly rent. The effect of a return-on-investment method is to penalize L1,
who had attempted to treat tenants fairly. Because he charged a lower rent prior
to the enactment of rent control, I? cannot realize a fair return on his investment.
100. Id.
101. The Consumer Price Index is a statistical measure of fluctuations in urban
consumers' costs of living; it is widely used as a measure of the dollar's purchasing
power. The United States Bureau of Labor Statistics computes the index by calcu-
lating percentage price changes of a sample "market basket" of goods and services
in major expenditure groups such as food, housing, apparel, transportation, and
health and recreation. It then weights the percentage price changes in accordance
with the relative importance of each item. The index is the average of these
weighted percentage price changes.
The Consumer Price Index was revised beginning in 1978. Among other changes,
the comprehensive revision updates the sample of items priced and the weights
assigned to the expenditure groups. The revision also provides an additional index
representing nearly all consumers' experience as opposed to wage and clerical
workers alone. BUREAU OF LABOR STATIsTIcs, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, THE CONSuMER
PRUCE INDEX-REWiSION-1978, at 1 (1978).
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only a fraction of that increase.102 In the alternative, rent control
legislation may regulate rent increases simply by setting a ceiling
on the annual allowable percentage increase.
0 3
Landlords compute each unit's increase by applying the al-
lowable percentage, whether a fixed annual rate or a rate based
upon the CPI, to existing rents. The New Jersey Supreme Court
has sustained the limitation of these increases to a fraction of the
CPI percentage increase. 0 4 The court emphasized that the land-
lords themselves had selected the base rents to which the per-
centage was applied. In some cases, allowing an increase equal to
100% of the CPI increase would perpetuate the recovery of exor-
bitant rents: 'Therefore, at least in some instances, rent increase
formulae which limit rent increases to an amount less than the
percentage increase in the CPI may be not only rational but may
be necessary if rent control is to protect tenants from unjust and
exorbitant rents." 0 5
In addition to permitting the allowable percentage increase, a
rent control measure may allow landlords to apply for surcharges,
labeled "pass-throughs," for tax increases 106 or for capital im-
provements.V0 7 Certain problems accompany the inclusion of
pass-throughs in rent control measures. For tax pass-throughs,
drafters should consider how to require apportionment of the
taxes among the tenants: by rent paid, by square feet occupied, or
by rooms rented. Another consideration is whether tenants
102. See, e.g., Troy Hills Village v. Township Council, 68 N.J. 604, 613 n.2, 350
A.2d 34, 38 n.2 (1975) (maximum percentage increase of 60% times the weighted
annual average by quarters of the CPI increase); Brunetti v. Borough of New
Milford, 68 N.J. 576, 584, 350 A.2d 19, 23 (1975) (limits allowable rent increases to
50% of the percentage increase in the CPI); Hutton Park Gardens v. Town Coun-
cil, 68 N.J. 543, 552, 554-55, 350 A.2d 1, 6 (1975) (West Orange-100% of CPI increase;
Wayne Township-50% of CPI increase).
103. See, e.g., Westchester W. No. 2 Ltd. v. Montgomery County, 276 Md. 448, 449,
348 A.2d 856, 857 (1975) (maximum of four percent of existing rent).
104. Hutton Park Gardens v. Town Council, 68 N.J. 543, 574-75, 350 A.2d 1, 18
(1975).
105. 1I
106. See, e.g., Troy Hills Village v. Township Council, 68 N.J. 604, 614, 350 A.2d 34,
39 (1975) (based on ratio of the square footage occupied by the tenant to the total
square footage of the building); Brunetti v. Borough of New Milford, 68 N.J. 576,
583, 350 A.2d 19, 22 (1975) (based on percentage of total rooms in the building occu-
pied by the tenant); Hutton Park Gardens v. Town Council, 68 N.J. 543, 552-54, 350
A.2d 1, 15-16 (1975) (West Orange-based on percentage of square footage of build-
ing occupied by tenant to a maximum of five percent of existing rent; Wayne
Township-based on percentage of rooms occupied).
107. See, e.g., Troy Hills Village v. Township Council, 68 N.J. 604,614,350 A.2d 34,
39 (1975); Hutton Park Gardens v. Town Council, 68 N.J. 543, 53-54, 350 A.2d 1, 6
(1975). But cf. Brunetti v. Borough of New Milford, 68 N.J. 576, 350 A.2d 19 (1975)
(ordinance did not allow pass-through of capital improvement costs; New Jersey
Supreme Court could not say a priori that the ordinance would necessarily leave
landlords with inadequate revenue for normal maintenance).
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should benefit from landlords' successful tax appeals or tax re-
duction.108 One local rent control ordinance has met this problem
by requiring landlords to disburse among their tenants fifty per-
cent of any reduction. Tenants receive the disbursement in pro-
portion to the amounts for which they are responsible under the
tax surcharge formula.109
Capital improvement pass-throughs can also present problems.
Landlords might shift to tenants the cost of repairing code viola-
tions which landlords are obliged to correct. In addition, landlords
might use capital improvement pass-throughs to circumvent ten-
ant protections against retaliatory rent increases. Legislation may
attempt to retain tenant protection by making the landlord's good
faith maintenance of the premises a condition precedent to ob-
taining a pass-through.1 0 Some rent control measures allow only
"major" capital improvements to be charged the tenants."'
Rent adjustment provisions may place an upper limit on the to-
tal annual rent increase. A separate ceiling may apply to each
type of surcharge, while another ceiling may apply to the total of
these surcharges."12 Certain surcharges may not be subject to any
ceiling.1 3 Finally, the legislation may contain a single upper limit
above which the total of the annual percentage increases plus
surcharges may not go.114
Commentators have advocated the use of the annual percent-
age increase when rents are equalized and are not excessive and
when housing stock is in relatively good condition. By setting rel-
atively uniform limits on rent increases, this method can help
guard against future rent-gouging and inflation. The commenta-
tors point out that if tenants receive adequate information con-
108. Second Generation Rent Control, supra note 13, at 244. See generally cases
cited note 106 supra.
109. Brunetti v. Borough of New Milford, 68 N.J. 576, 583, 350 A.2d 19, 22 (1975).
Thus, a tenant responsible for 10% of the landlord's tax increase would receive
10% of any amount the landlord disbursed pursuant to a tax reduction.
110. Second Generation Rent Controls, supra note 13, at 244.
111. See, e.g., Hutton Park Gardens v. Town Council, 68 N.J. 543, 553-54, 350 A.2d
1, 6 (1975).
112. See, e.g., id. Under the West Orange ordinance, total tax surcharges could
not exceed five percent of existing rent. Surcharges for major capital improve-
ments could not exceed 10% of existing rent. The ordinance placed a 10% rent ceil-
ing on the aggregate of all additional increases and surcharges.
113. See, e.g., Brunetti v. Borough of New Milford, 68 N.J. 576, 590 n.16, 350 A.2d
19, 26 n.16 (1975) (no ceiling on hardship rent increases).
114. See Hutton Park Gardens v. Town Council, 68 N.J. 543, 553 n.2, 350 A.2d 1, 6
n.2 (1975).
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cerning allowable rent increases, the percentage system can
become self-enforcing.115
Evaluation of Individual Cases by Rent Control Boards
Connecticut authorizes its municipal legislative bodies to cre-
ate fair rent commissions to control and eliminate excessive
rental charges.116 A fair rent commission analyzes rents on a
case-by-case basis. The commission takes into account factors
such as rents charged for similar accommodations, sanitary con-
ditions, services, and repairs necessary."17 "If a commission deter-
mines, after a hearing, that the rent charges for any housing
accommodation are so excessive ... as to be harsh and uncon-
scionable, it may order a reduction in rent to such an amount as it
determines to be fair and equitable."118
Hardship Rent Adjustments
Rent control legislation may make hardship rent adjustments
possible in addition to the annual rental increase. A landlord may
apply for such an adjustment when he or she cannot meet mort-
gage or maintenance costs."19 One New Jersey local ordinance
also permitted a hardship rent increase if the landlord proved he
or she could not realize a reasonable return on the investment in
the property.120 The rent control measure may subject the hard-
ship rent adjustment to the same upper limits as other rental in-
creases and surcharges.' 21
Eviction Controls
A landlord holds a dominant bargaining position during periods
of rising prices when housing is in short supply.122 Rent control
can be circumvented by landlords who threaten to evict tenants
who refuse to pay rent increases. Rent control measures therefore
often limit the permissible grounds for eviction and set proce-
115. Second Generation Rent Controis, supra note 13, at 244.
116. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-148b (West 1972).
117. Id § 7-148c.
118. IdL § 7-148d.
119. See, e.g., Troy Hills Village v. Township Council, 68 N.J. 604, 614, 350 A.2d 34,
39 (1975); Hutton Park Gardens v. Town Council, 68 N.J. 543, 553-54, 350 A.2d 1, 6
(1975).
120. See Brunetti v. Borough of New Milford, 68 N.J. 576, 583, 350 A.2d 19, 23
(1975). The New Jersey Supreme Court construed the clause as the equivalent of a
requirement that landlords must be permitted a fair return on investment. Thus,
the ordinance was not facially confiscatory.
121. See, e.g., Hutton Park Gardens v. Town Council, 68 N.J. 543, 553-54, 350 A.2d
1, 6 (1975).
122. Case Note, Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley, 65 CAxIm. L. REV. 304, 309 (1977).
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dures for local enforcement. 23
The major hazard in including a local eviction control scheme
is the possibility that a state statute may preempt the eviction
field. Most courts hold that state unlawful detainer statutes pre-
empt local eviction controls, rendering them void.124 Whether the
remainder of the rent control law remains valid depends upon
whether the voided provisions are severable.125
The California Supreme Court adopted the minority view in its
opinion in Birkenfeld.126 The court distinguished the statutory
procedures for unlawful detainer proceedings127 from the sub-
stantive grounds for eviction.128 The court held that local rent con-
trol legislation can validly limit 'the substantive grounds for
eviction in order to enforce rent ceilings. 2 9 The procedural pur-
pose of the state unlawful detainer remedy does not preclude cit-
ies from imposing such controls. The court concluded that a
tenant can assert the provisions limiting the grounds for eviction
as a substantive defense in unlawful detainer proceedings.
3 0
In 1974, New Jersey adopted statewide limitations on the re-
moval of residential tenants. 3 1 This eviction-for-cause law enu-
merated the permissible grounds for eviction. The New Jersey
Supreme Court since has held that the state thereby preempted
the subject of substantive grounds for eviction. Consequently,
123. Id. at 308.
124. E.g., Burton v. City of Hartford, 144 Conn. 80, 127 A.2d 251 (1956); City of
Miami Beach v. Fleetwood Hotel, Inc., 261 So. 2d 801 (Fla. 1972); Huebeck v. City of
Baltimore, 205 Md. 203, 107 A.2d 99 (1954); F.T.B. Corp. v. Goodman, 300 N.Y. 140, 89
N.E.2d 865 (1949).
125. See notes 75-78 and accompanying text supra
126. 17 Cal. 3d 129, 550 P.2d 1001, 130 Cal. Rptr. 465 (1976).
127. CAI. CIv. PROC. CODE §§ 1159-1179a (West Supp. 1977).
128. Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley, 17 Cal. 3d 129, 149, 550 P.2d 1001, 1015-16, 130
Cal. Rptr. 465, 479-80 (1976).
129. 1& at 149, 550 P.2d at 1016, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 480. The amendment permitted
the following grounds for eviction: tenant's failure to pay rent, other breach of
duty to the landlord or misconduct, landlord's good faith intention to remove the
unit from the housing market for certain permissible purposes, and, tenant's re-
fusal to execute a written renewal or extension of a lease which had expired.
Amendment to Berkeley City Charter, art. XVII, § 7(a) (1), res. ch. 96, 1972 Cal.
Stats. 3370, reprinted in Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley, 17 Cal. 3d at 174-80, 550 P.2d
at 1033-40, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 497-504.
130. Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley, 17 Cal. 3d 129, 149, 550 P.2d 1001, 1015-16, 130
Cal. Rptr. 465, 479-80 (1976). For a discussion of the implications of this decision in
California, see Case Note, Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley, 65 CALIF. L REV. 304
(1977).
131. Act of June 25, 1974, ch. 49, 1974 N.J. Laws 119 (codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2A.18-61.1 (West Supp. 1977)).
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provisions in municipal rent control ordinances attempting to
limit further the permissible grounds for eviction are invalid.132
Drafters of rent control measures in states not specifying
grounds for eviction may wish to include eviction-for-cause provi-
sions. Drafters should remember, however, that a majority of
courts find that state law preempts the entire field of eviction,
substantive as well as procedural. Nevertheless, in a minority ju-
risdiction, the inclusion of an eviction-for-cause provision in rent
control legislation gives tenants extensive protection against rent
increases and evictions.133
Other Provisions
Administration, Funding, and Enforcement
State enabling legislation can grant wide discretion to the rent
control board or administrator charged with interpreting and en-
forcing rent control measures.134 Rent control legislation should
therefore address several additional factors. The legislation
should prescribe the method of funding the board or administra-
tor, its staff, and the hearing and enforcement mechanisms.135 To
promote smooth implementation, the legislation should provide
some "lead time" between the date of enactment and the effective
date. In this manner, election or appointment of the board or ad-
ministrator and adoption of necessary rules and regulations can
occur before the controls take effect. The legislation should also
set standards for the election or appointment of the board or ad-
ministrator. 36
Rent control legislation should contain penalties for willful vio-
lation of the law. 37 The legislation can set forth criminal penal-
ties of fine or imprisonment. The severity of the punishment
could increase if a prior offender continues to violate the rent
control law. The legislation can also provide tenants with civil
remedies in the nature of damages or injunctive relief. If the legis-
lation gives the rent control board or administrator standing to
132. Brunetti v. Borough of New Milford, 68 N.J. 576, 603, 350 A.2d 19, 33 (1975).
133. Second Generation Rent Controls, supra note 13, at 245.
134. However, excessive delegation of authority can be invalid. City of Miami
Beach v. Forte Towers, Inc., 305 So. 2d 764 (Fla. 1974).
135. Second Generation Rent Controls, supra note 13, at 245. Possible methods
of funding include state and local allocation of funds, charges for registration of
controlled units, and charges for hearing fees.
136. Id. If the board or administrator is appointed, legislation should specify
who bears the responsibility for appointment and what the standards of appoint-
ment are. For example, legislation might require that landlords and tenants have
equal representation on the board. See id., at 245 n.78.
137. C. AsHmUN & R. FRANKEN, RENT CONTROL: AN INTERIm REPORT TO THE As-
SEMBLY COMMITEE ON HOUSING AND CommuNrry DEVELOPMENT 27 (1975).
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pursue these remedies in lieu of the injured tenant, the legisla-
tion can be enforced with even greater diligence. Strong enforce-
ment provisions will help the board or administrator effectively
implement rent control legislation.
Rent control measures should provide for notice and fair hear-
ings for both landlords and tenants in compliance with minimum
standards of due process.138 Objective standards and guidelines
should appear in the legislation or should be readily inferable
from its language to avoid unlawful delegation of legislative au-
thority.139 Drafters of rent controls should exercise care in design-
ing such standards to avoid implementing standards so restrictive
or so rigid that they render the legislation facially confiscatory.
Termination Date
Courts in many jurisdictions continue to require the existence
of an emergency to justify rent controls. Because no emergency is
presumed to continue indefinitely, most rent control legislation
contains a specific expiration date, usually three to five years
from its effective date.140 Drafters may wish to include a provision
for renewal as well.
Devices for Preventing Housing Deterioration
Tenants in controlled rental units may be concerned that land-
lords will decrease services or maintenance in retaliation to rent
control. As a protective measure, legislation could grant the rent
control board or administrator the power to decrease a landlord's
rental charges if services or maintenance decline.141 Alternatively,
the legislation might require landlords to maintain certain mini-
mum service standards. 42 Landlords would be required to peti-
tion the rent control board or administrator regarding any
138. Second Generation Rent Controls, supra note 13, at 246.
139. City of Miami Beach v. Fleetwood Hotel, Inc., 261 So. 2d 801, 805 (Fla. 1972).
A municipal legislative body may authorize administrative officers to prescribe
rules and regulations that implement a policy declared by the legislative body.
However, a municipal legislative body is constitutionally prohibited from delegat-
ing the formulation of legislative policy. Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley, 17 Cal. 3d
129, 167, 550 P.2d 1001, 1028, 130 Cal. Rptr. 465, 492 (1976).
140. C. AsHmUN & R. FRANKEN, RENT CowROL: AN INTERIm REPORT TO THE As-
SEMBLY COMiMrEE ON HOUSING AND CoMUNrrY DEVELOPMENT 15 (1975).
141. See, e.g., Overlook Terrace Management Corp. v. Rent Control Bd., 71 NJ.
451, 457, 366 A.2d 321, 324 (1976).
-142. See, e.g., Lifschitz v. City of Miami Beach, 339 So. 2d 232, 236 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1976).
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proposed reductions in services. 43 Such legislation could prevent
landlords from reducing services provided as of a set date without
a valid reason.
SAMPLE RENT CONTROL LEGISLATION
The following sample rent control ordinance illustrates the gen-
eral structure of rent control legislation and incorporates many of




The Town of X faces a serious housing problem.145 The overall
vacancy rate in the Town of X is less than five percent. Rents are
continually increasing, and the condition of existing housing stock
is steadily declining. The purpose of this ordinance is to alleviate
this housing problem and to promote the health, safety, and wel-
fare of the citizens of the Town of X.
I. Rent Control Boardl46
The Town of X shall establish a Rent Control Board consisting
of five Commissioners. The Mayor of the Town of X shall appoint
the Commissioners within sixty days of the date of this ordi-
nance. Two Commissioners shall be members of the Town of X
Tenant Organization and two Commissioners shall be landlords
in the Town of X. The fifth Commissioner shall be a residential
homeowner in the Town of X who is not a landlord.
The Commissioners shall serve an initial term of two years
and, if reappointed, may serve a maximum of one additional two-
year term. Each Commissioner shall receive twenty-five dollars
for each meeting attended. However, a Commissioner's compen-
sation shall not exceed $1200 in any calendar year.
The Rent Control Board is empowered to roll back rents to a
base rent established in Section IH and to adjust rents as pro-
143. Id.
144. The author used Amendment to Berkeley City Charter, art. XVII, res. ch.
96, 1972 Cal. Stats. 3370, reprinted in Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley, 17 Cal. 3d at
174-80, 550 P.2d at 1033-40, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 497-504, and Act of Aug. 31, 1970, ch. 842,
§§ 1-14 (codified at MAss. GEN. LAws ANw. ch. 40 app., §§ 1-1 to -14 (West Supp.
1977)) (expired 1976) as guidelines in constructing this sample ordinance. Readers
are forewarned that actual legislation must contain more specific information, par-
ticularly concerning procedures required, hearings available, and funding mecha-
nsms.
145. See text accompanying notes 24-49 supra.
146. See notes 134-36 and accompanying text supra.
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vided in Section IV. The Board shall promulgate such rules and
regulations as will further the purposes of this ordinance and
shall appoint such staff as might be necessary to perform the
Board's functions.
H. Exemptions' 47
All rental units in the Town of X shall be subject to the con-
trols established by this ordinance except:
(a) owner-occupied rental units with fewer than
four units;
(b) rental units in hotels and motels which are
rented primarily to transient guests; and
(c) rental units owned, operated, or subsidized by a
governmental agency.
III. Base Rent'4 8
The base rent shall be the rent in effect 180 days prior to the
date of passage of this ordinance. In the case of newly con-
structed units completed after the rollback date, the base rent
shall be the initial rent charged. The base rent shall take effect
ninety days after the appointment of the Rent Control Board.
IV. Rent Adjustments14
9
At the expiration or termination of a lease, the landlord of a
controlled unit may increase the rent subject to the following lim-
itations:
(a) Rent increases may not exceed fifty percent of
the difference between the Consumer Price In-
dex 120 days prior to the commencement of the
lease and the Consumer Price Index 120 days
prior to the expiration or the termination of the
lease.
(b) Landlords may surcharge tenants for a portion
of any property tax increase. Landlords shall ap-
portion such surcharges according to the per-
centage of the square footage of the building
147. See notes 79-83 and accompanying text supra.
148. See notes 84-95 and accompanying text supra.
149. See notes 96-121 and accompanying text supra.
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occupied by each tenant. A tax surcharge in-
crease may not exceed five percent of a tenant's
existing rent.
(c) A landlord may apply to the Rent Control Board
for a rent surcharge of up to ten percent of the
existing rent:
(1) when a landlord has made major capital
improvements or increases in service; or
(2) if a landlord cannot meet mortgage obliga-
tions or maintenance costs.
V. Non-waiverability
Tenants may not waive the provisions of this ordinance. Any
agreement purporting to constitute such a waiver shall be void.
VI. Judicial Review
A landlord or tenant aggrieved by any action, regulation, or de-
cision of the Rent Control Board may appeal to the appropriate
court within the jurisdiction.
VII. Sanctions
A tenant paying rent in excess of the maximum lawful rent
may recover from the landlord three times the amount of the ex-
cess or one hundred dollars, whichever is greater. In addition, the
tenant may recover reasonable attorneys' fees and costs as deter-
mined by the court.150
A tenant or class of tenants receiving substantially lower stan-
dards of service, maintenance, or equipment than their landlord
provided prior to the enactment of this ordinance may apply to
the Rent Control Board for a rental decrease.' 5 ' The Board shall
adjust the rent to the reasonable rental value until the landlord
proves that he or she has corrected the deficiency.
The Rent Control Board, tenants, and landlords of controlled
units may seek to restrain by injunction any violation of this ordi-
nance or of the Board's rules, regulations, and decisions.
VIII. Severability
The provisions of this ordinance are severable. Should a court
hold any provision of this ordinance invalid, such invalidity shall
not affect other independent provisions of this ordinance.
150. See text accompanying note 137 supra.
151. See notes 141-43 and accompanying text supra
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IX. Effective Date: Termination Date
This ordinance shall take effect ninety days from the date of
enactment. This ordinance shall remain in full force and effect for
two years beginning with the effective date. The Town Council
may renew this ordinance for additional one-year periods if re-
newal is deemed necessary in light of housing conditions existing
at the termination date.
CONCLUSION
Rent control measures may provide tenants with relief from
the pressures of rising rents in periods when alternative housing
is scarce. Opponents of rent control may stand in the way of such
relief, however, by challenging the legislation in the courts or by
finding a means of circumventing the law. Because a court may
find a challenged rent control law constitutionally deficient in var-
ious ways, drafters must exercise great care in designing the leg-
islation. In addition to withstanding constitutional challenges,
effective rent control should also meet landlords' retaliatory reac-
tions. The guidelines in this Comment attempt to present meth-
ods of achieving both objectives.
KATHRYN LoRi PARTmicK
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